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International Gold Price Movements, 1972-1982

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During the last decade, gold price has shown proneness to large and rapid fluctuations. Gold price has changed at particularly spectacular speeds in the latter half of the decade. The dollar price of gold increased more than eight times from a low of about $100 an ounce in the summer of 1976 to a high of $850 in January 1980. In the following eighteen months ending in June 1982, the price declined to less than $300 an ounce, i.e., to almost one-third of the peak reached in January 1980. Recently, between July and September 1982, gold price underwent a mini-cycle, first rising from $300 to $500 an ounce and then declining to $400.

It will be recalled that between 1934 and 1968 gold price was maintained at $25 an ounce by the efforts of national monetary authorities. Official attempts at controlling the market price of gold were, however, abandoned in March 1968. The two-tier gold pricing system then came into being: transactions in gold between national monetary authorities continued to be underwritten by the USA at $35 an ounce; on the private market, gold price was left to find its own level. In August 1971, the two-tier system was also abandoned. The United States refused to convert even official holdings of dollar into gold at $35 an ounce. The official gold price ceased to exist (except for some accounting purposes), and though national monetary authorities have
continued to buy and sell gold, no attempt has been made by them to keep the free market price of gold within well-defined limits.

In this paper, we focus on gold price movements during the decade 1972 - 1982, i.e., the period after the abandoning of the two-tier price system in August 1971. The decade, we have indicated, witnessed large fluctuations in gold price. The fluctuations were, however, not random. Gold price traced out two principle cycles during the decade. Moving up from 1971, it reached a peak in December 1974, then fell till the third quarter of 1976, rose again till early 1980, after which it fell up to June 1982. Though we shall be concerned primarily with these two cycles, we shall also indicate how the recent mini-cycle between June and September 1982 could be explained in terms of our analysis of the decade immediately preceding.

Several developments in world economy could have influenced movements in gold price. Our study, however, has led to conclude that the gold price cycles in the last decade were generated principally by speculative behaviour. The speculative behaviour, in turn, was influenced by cyclical forces in the world economic system.

However, as we shall note, an earlier study, covering a much more extended period, indicates that gold price has, in the past, not quite responded to cyclical economic forces. During the decade under review, certain special features of international economic developments, directly or indirectly, seem to have had an impact on gold price.
The paper is, therefore, organised as follows: In section 1, we highlight the major changes in the world economy during the last decade. Section 2 attempts an analysis of the present international gold market and assesses the relative importance of the various major supply and demand factors. Section 3 concentrates on private investment demand for gold as distinct from the demand for jewellery, dentistry and industrial purposes. It is in this section that we discuss the role of speculation. The three sections which follow analyse the impact of factors possibly influencing speculation in gold. The factors we discuss are i) inflationary expectations, ii) exchange rate fluctuations and iii) interest rates changes. Gold price movements between July and September 1982 are analysed in Section 7. The paper ends with some concluding observations.

Section 1: The international environment

The following features of the world economy during the decade, 1972 – 1982, are worth noting:

1) There was an almost steady deceleration in world production and trade. (See Table 1) This was accompanied by increasing unemployment rates. In the OECD countries unemployment rate doubled from 2.6 per cent in the 1960s to 5.3 per cent in the second half of the 1970s, and is projected to increase to 8 per cent in 1982.2 The deceleration in production was accompanied by rising inflation. The average inflation rate increased to 8-10 per cent in 1970s from 3-4 per cent in the 1960s.
2) There was at the same time a large growth of the financial superstructure. Total outstanding international bank claims grew at 25 per cent per annum in gross terms international bank assets increased from about $150 billion on 1970 to more than $1500 billion in early 1982 and in net terms (i.e., not of inter bank transactions) from about $100 to about $1000 billion over the same period. 3/

3) The increased financial activity was accompanied by greater financial instability, as reflected in volatile interest rates and exchange rates. The world moved from a system of fixed exchange rates to a system of floating exchange rates, partially in 1971 and almost totally in 1973. The volatility of exchange rates partly reflected financial speculation. It also reflected varied national growth performances and policies. Moreover, the higher inflation rates in the 1970s were accompanied by greater volatility in national inflation rates as well as greater divergences between national inflation rates.

4) OPEC, the cartel formed by the major petroleum producers, effectively demonstrated in 1973-74 and in 1979-80 its ability to enforce substantial discrete increases in the nominal price of its petroleum exports and thereby achieve considerable improvement in its terms of trade.

Section 2: The gold market

It has been estimated that the cumulative aggregate of gold ever mined would probably be in the range of 90,000
to 116,000 tons. Of this aggregate, more than 60,000 tons are possibly available today in the form of official and private holdings of bullion, gold and jewellery. Approximately half of the available stock, i.e. about 30,000 tons, is held in the form of reserves by national monetary authorities.

The annual new supply of gold in the 1970s has been in the range of 1300 to 1600 tons. The new supply, therefore, forms less than 3 per cent of existing aggregate stock and about 6 per cent of monetary stock. The Russians produce around 300 tons and the Chinese about 50 tons every year. The rest of the new supply comes from the non-communist countries. In recent years, South Africa has been producing 650-700 tons, which is about 70 per cent of non-communist production. Aggregate non-communist production has however tended to decline over the 1970s, primarily on account of a continuous fall in South African production from 975 tons in 1971 to 650 tons in 1981.

Our discussion below relates only to the non-communist gold market. The total annual supply of gold in the non-communist countries for official and non-official uses is obtained as the sum of current production in the non-communist countries and the net exports of the communist countries. This aggregate, when adjusted for official transactions, gives the annual gold supply for private purposes.
On the demand side, jewellery demand, though fluctuating, has constituted most of the private demand. In five of the 11 years between 1971 and 1981, jewellery demand was around 1000 tons, which worked out to 80 per cent or more of the available supply for private uses. The demand for jewellery, however, fell to as low as 120 tons in 1980, which was 15 per cent of available supply. Between 200 and 250 tons have each year been taken up by dentistry and industrial uses. The rest has gone into coins and bullion holdings. The last category of demand, i.e., the demand for bullion, is derived as a residual.

For the purposes of our analysis we refer to the demand for jewellery, dentistry and industrial purposes as constituting the current consumption demand for gold, and the demand for coins and bullion as constituting the investment demand for gold.

The relative importance of supply and demand factors

In the charts that follow gold price has been plotted against gold supply and non-official demand components. Here, as in further analysis, gold price (expressed in US dollars) has been deflated by the UN export price index of manufactured goods (which is also based on US dollar prices). This deflation has been performed in order to isolate factors operating in the gold market from influences on gold price reflecting only changes in the US dollar exchange rate or general inflationary trends. The
manufactured exports price index has been used as an index of general inflationary trends on the understanding that prices in the manufactures sector set the pace to prices in other sectors.

From chart 1 it may be seen that cyclical movements in gold price can be explained neither by variations in aggregate supply for official and non-official purposes, nor by the variations in the supply only to the latter. The current consumption demand, i.e. the demand for jewellery, dentistry and industrial uses, is also unable to explain gold price changes. (See chart 2.) Indeed, there appears to be an inverse relationship between consumption demand and real gold price, which indicates that gold price influences this demand rather than vice versa.

The demand for bullion alone, which as indicated above is derived as a residual, seems to follow the curve of the real gold price reasonably well. Moreover, if this demand is expressed as a proportion of the supply to the non-communist private sector, there appears a very close correspondence between the direction of the year-to-year movements of gold price and the demand for bullion. (See chart 3.)

If to bullion demand we add the demand for official coins to represent the aggregate investment demand for gold, we find that the gold price moves almost completely in sympathy with the investment demand. (See chart 4.) It, therefore appears that gold price during the last decade has been
determined primarily by changes in investment demand.

**Section 3: Investment demand for gold**

Often investment demand is thought to consist of two components: a speculative demand (in expectation of a (relative) price rise and hence a capital gain) and hedging demand (also in expectation of a (relative) price rise but more with a view to preventing a loss in the real value of assets (particularly currencies) held). Following Machlup, however, we regard all of investment demand for gold as speculative in nature regardless of whether it is in anticipation of price rise of gold or to insure against expected loss in the value of other assets. According to Machlup: "... any purchase of gold in expectation of an increase in its price shall be characterised as speculative ... Most buyers of gold, seeking merely protection against inflation, do not regard themselves as speculators; but for purposes of analysis it makes no difference whether a purchaser wants to avoid loss from the depreciation of money or whether he seeks capital gain from the appreciation of gold." (Machlup 1969, pp 333 and 340).

**Factors affecting speculation:**

We have that soon gold price in the last decade has been determined mainly by investment demand for gold which, as we have noted, is altogether speculative in nature. That then raises the further question: what are the factors in-
fluencing speculative demand for gold? In the current inter-
national economic environment, gold price may be expected
to rise when: a) inflationary expectations are generated
on account of rapidly rising price; and b) exchange rates
fluctuate rapidly. The first factor creates an expectation
of depreciation in the value of currencies. The second re-
flects uncertainty in the expected value of currencies as
well as general uncertainty in the economic environment.
Higher inflationary expectations and exchange rate fluctua-
tions may, therefore, be expected to result in some movement
out of currencies. Such movement out would, in part, create
greater investment demand for gold, raising the gold price.1

On the other hand, since gold is a non-interest bear-
ing asset, large increases in interest rates may be expected
to discourage holding of gold, given the expectations with
respect to the appreciation in the price of gold.

In the following sections, we, therefore, discuss the
influence on gold price of inflationary expectations, un-
certainty in the foreign exchange markets and interest rates
changes. In discussing changes in interest rates, we also
get some clues to understanding the cyclical behaviour of
gold price.

Section 4: Inflationary expectations

How do the rate of inflation and the inflationary
expectations react on the investment demand for gold? This
is the question to which this section is addressed. Assuming
that inflationary expectations are based on the rate of price increase in the previous year, we first consider petroleum price increases since these have significantly contributed to inflationary expectations in the last decade and then look into the overall inflation rates, as reflected in the movements of the price index of manufactured exports.

**Petroleum price**

In chart 5, real gold price has been plotted against the rate of increase of nominal petroleum price in the previous year. It will be noted that in a number of years gold price and the rate of increase (or decrease) of petroleum price move in the same direction. However, the correspondence is not complete. This may be seen more sharply from chart 6 which has been plotted using quarterly (rather than annual) observations. Essentially, petroleum price change "explain" the accentuation of the uptrend in gold price. They do not, however, "explain" the start of the uptrend. This is so particularly for the upward phase of the second cycle starting towards the end of 1976. Petroleum price remained steady in nominal terms and declined in real terms as gold price began to move up.

**General inflation**

In chart 7, real gold price is plotted against the rate of inflation (rate of growth of the export price index of manufactured goods) in the previous year. The rate of
inflation in the previous year shows a close relationship in directional movements with the real gold price. In particular, the two curves trace out the same cycles. However, the relationship fails to hold in 1979-80. The large rise in 1979-80, we find, was related not to the general inflation rate but to inflationary expectations based on the sharp rise in particular commodities of critical importance, such as petroleum (which was discussed above) and food (see chart 8).

The implications of the observed relationship between general inflation and gold price should be noted. In an inflationary period, the real gold price has tended to increase. But the real gold price is the nominal gold price deflated by the price index of manufactured exports, which is also the index we have used to measure general inflation. Thus in an inflationary period, the nominal gold price has tended to increase faster than general inflation, i.e. the purchasing power of gold has increased.

Earlier experience

It is worth noting at this point that the upward movement of real gold price during a period of boom in prices is, historically speaking, a new development. Jastram, who has studied the history of gold price between 1560 and 1976, has concluded:

"To repeat, the evidence is convincing ...: when inflation set in, the purchasing power of gold declines" (p. 172).
Also,

"... gold is not a satisfactory hedge against inflation (but does very well in period of deflation) ..." (p. 178).

According to Jastram, gold has, in general, not matched the cyclical swings in prices. During the upward phase of a price cycle, gold has lost its purchasing power. During the deflationary phase, gold has continued its steady rise and caught up, so to say, with general price level, thus maintaining its purchasing power over a cycle and in the long run. However, Jastram himself notes a deviation from this behaviour in the first half of the 1970s (Jastram, 1976, p. 172), when gold increased its purchasing power in an inflationary phase. Our findings, covering the whole decade of the 1970s, show that the pattern of the first half of the seventies has continued into the second half.

The relatively new phenomenon of real gold price rising in a period of cyclical upswing is due probably to the growth of the financial superstructure (referred to in the first section above). Moreover, it cannot be overlooked that inflation in the seventies has co-existed with deceleration in productive activity, a phenomenon often referred to as stagflation. Could it be that speculative investment in gold offers higher expected returns than productive activity in such circumstances?
Section 5: Exchange rate behaviour

After the Second World War, the US dollar emerged as the most important international currency. The dollar's dominant position arose principally from the strength of the US economy: its large share in world production and trade, its well-developed financial markets and its stable price level. Also, the fixed exchange rate system that was hammered out at Bretton Woods accorded to the US dollar the role of the one and only reserve currency.

In the 1950s, dollars necessary for financing world trade and for building up international reserves were in short supply. However, with the US exporting a large amount of long term capital and later running large current account deficits in addition, dollar balances outside the US grew rapidly and by the mid-1960s, the dollar began to come under pressure. The US found its monetary gold stock depleting in its attempt to maintain the gold value of dollar (1/35th of an ounce). In 1971, therefore, the US suspended dollar convertibility in gold and also devalued the dollar. In 1973, the "fixed" exchange rate system itself was abandoned in favour of the "floating" exchange rate system (under which market forces, subject to central banks' intervention from time to time, determine the exchange rate alignments).

It was only to be expected that with the freeing of gold price and exchange rates, asset portfolios of the central banks and private investors would change. A financial port-
folio may be changed either to increase the expected rate of return (or yield) or to reduce the riskiness of the expected yield. A recent study shows that the structure of expected real returns of currencies changed in the 1970s creating a strong incentive to move out of the dollar into other currencies, mainly Deutsche Mark, Swiss Franc and the Japanese Yen (see Dornbusch, 1980). The share of the dollar in the foreign exchange reserves of national monetary authorities declined from 87 per cent in 1976: IV to 61 per cent in 1980: IV. Over the same period, the share of the Deutsche Mark increased from 7 to 11 per cent, of the Swiss Franc from 1½ to 3 per cent and of the Yen from 1 to 3 per cent. The share of the dollar in international lending declined from 74 per cent in mid-1976 to 65 per cent in mid-1980.9

Similarly, Kouri and de Macedo (1978, p.122, Table 1) have estimated that over certain periods in the 1970s gold would have had a higher rate of return than any currency. Expectations based on such high realised returns probably created an incentive to diversify into gold and contributed to the secular rise in gold price, as seen in the higher peak of the real gold price in the second cycle.9

**Exchange rates' volatility**

But can exchange rate movements throw any light on the cyclical movements of gold price? To examine this question we looked into the fluctuations in exchange rates. The measure of fluctuations used was the standard deviation of monthly
percentage changes in exchange rate and it was applied to the S/DM exchange rate. From Table 2 it may be seen that the real gold price has increased with increasing exchange rate fluctuations and declined with decreasing exchange rate fluctuation. The exchange rate fluctuations trace our the same cycles as the gold price.

The relationship observed needs to be explained. On the one hand, it could be argued that rising exchange rate fluctuations create an incentive to diversify the asset portfolio in order to minimise risk. Because of the heavy concentration of the dollar in asset portfolios, diversification basically implies a movement out of dollars into either other currencies or into gold. Thus in a period of increasing exchange rate fluctuation, the investment demand for gold rises, and hence gold price goes up.

However, it would also be noted from Table 2 that fluctuations in real gold price (estimated in the same way as exchange rate fluctuations) are consistently greater than the exchange rate fluctuations. It, therefore, hardly seems right to argue that diversification out of currencies into gold in periods of highly fluctuating exchange rate is primarily a risk minimising movement.

It should be noted in this context that though gold price fluctuations have been greater than exchange rate fluctuations, the two have tended to increase and decrease together. Thus, it could be interpreted that the two sets
of fluctuations are basically indices of uncertainty in the world economy. Increased uncertainty creates greater incentive for speculation. Hence in periods of high uncertainty, as reflected in the high fluctuations, the investment demand for gold goes up and, gold price, therefore, rises.

To link up with our previous section it will be noted that higher expectation of inflation rates has in general been accompanied by greater uncertainty, both reinforcing the incentive to invest in gold.

In 1981, however, exchange rate instability rose while inflationary expectations declined. Gold price fell, presumably, under the combined influence of lower inflationary expectations and high interest rates which had raised the opportunity cost of investment in gold. The large exchange rate fluctuations which coexisted with the fall in gold price and inflationary expectations reflected volatile interest rates and major divergences in national interest rates.

In the next section, we examine in some detail the influence of interest rates on gold price.

Section 5: Interest rate changes

Since gold does not earn an interest, a rise in interest rates, ceteris paribus, reduces the attractiveness of gold vis-a-vis interest earning assets of comparable liquidity. We plotted interest rates (US 3 month money market) against real gold price. (See charts 9 and 10.) The charts are quite striking. Instead of the inverse relationship that may be expected from the above ceteris paribus reasoning, the
two curves move reasonably parallel to each other, interest rates showing the same cyclical tendency. (This may be seen particularly from chart 10 where moving averages have been plotted to smooth out temporary fluctuations.) Only from the first quarter of 1980 to the first quarter of 1981 do interest rates and gold price move in opposite directions.

To explain the positive correlation between interest rates and gold prices, which held over most of the last decade we make a digression into the relationship between business cycles and interest rates.

**Business cycles and interest rates**

At least as far back as Marshall, it was noticed that interest rates are positively correlated with business activity over most of a business cycle. A more recent statement has been made by Cagan:

"... at first investors look favourably on capital projects despite the accompanying rise in interest rates; but if the rising cost of capital eventually exceeds expected returns, the resulting reduction in investment expenditure could bring a downturn in business activity. Then as the downturn gathers momentum, business prospects dim even further and the remnants of optimism fade. Investment undertakings previously held back by high interest
rates no longer appear attractive even when rates are much lower. If cutbacks in demand for capital funds are large, interest rates will decline. (Cagan, 1969, pp 3-4.)

To return to our basic theme, it appears unlikely that the investment demand for gold is large enough to pull up or push down the interest rates. A more plausible explanation seems to lie in the basic positive link between interest rates and economic activity. That this link also held in the last decade may be seen from charts 9 and 10, where world trade has been used as a proxy for general economic activity. The reasoning then proceeds as follows: a rise in economic activity during the last decade increased the demand pressure in the markets for goods and services and led to an acceleration of prices; this raised inflationary expectations and created greater uncertainty, which in turn had the effect (as discussed above) of raising the gold price; increased economic activity also increased demand for funds, which led to rising interest rates; gold price and interest rates were thus seen to rise together; on the downward phase of the business cycle, interest rate and gold price fell as the demand pressure in the capital and goods markets respectively declined.

While this appears to be the general picture, in 1980-81 there was a difference. Economic activity (as measured by the world trade index) stagnated after having grown only marginally in the previous year. This put a downward
pressure on prices. The consequent decline in inflationary expectations would have pushed gold price down in any case. In addition, interest rates, which normally decline (with a short lag) after general economic activity slows down, did not fall; instead they rose. The rise in interest rates despite weak demand conditions has been ascribed to the effects of the current US economic policy. For our purposes, it would appear that high interest rates reinforced the effect of lower inflationary expectations in pushing down gold price.

Section 7: Recent gold price movements

In our discussion thus far, we have not considered the influence on gold price of political upheavals, wars, national bankruptcies, runs on banks etc. Such special events do influence gold price and sometimes quite considerably. They bring in an additional element of uncertainty and tend to raise gold price. Our justification in ignoring these events in explaining the price movements over the last decade lies in that these special events do not explain the long term gold price movements; their impact is of short duration, however large may be the immediate magnitude of that impact. Such events only modulate the underlying movements of gold price. Thus, the Iran-Iraq confrontation which broke up during the upward phase of gold price cycle possibly created an additional uncertainty and led to gold price sky-rocketing to $850 an ounce in January 1980. On the other hand, the Polish crisis, which had at least as much international
significance as the Iran-Iraq crisis, occurred during a period when gold price was on the downward phase. Although there were some blips in the gold price graph, no new record levels of gold price were reached.

It is not being suggested that in discussing long-term movements one can altogether ignore either the effect of special events or the significance of short-term changes in gold price. Indeed, short-term changes need to be studied carefully, but their significance can best be understood in the framework of basic long-term trends.

We noted at the outset that, gold price having reached a sort of trough around $300 an ounce, started moving upwards in June 1982. Till early September the price rose and reached a peak of a little over $500 an ounce. Since then it has shown a tendency once again to decline, though it has not fallen significantly below $400 an ounce.

These recent gold price movements may be related partly to changes in interest rates. As we discussed above, lower interest rates reduce the cost of holding gold and therefore enhance the demand for gold, pushing its price up. Broadly the rise in gold price from the third week of June to early September was accompanied by falling interest rates, and the subsequent fall in gold price was accompanied by an edging up of interest rates. But interest rates were clearly not the main influence. It is significant that while gold price started rising in the third week of June, interest
ratios started falling only in the first week of July.

The rise in gold prices from the latter half of June seems to have followed the behaviour of commodity prices. From early 1980, commodity prices had been falling. But in the third week of June, metal prices started moving up and all other commodity prices hardened. Between June 22 and July 20, the Economist index of metal prices registered an improvement of 13 per cent while all other components of the commodity price index remained stable. It is not clear at this stage what this partial reversal in the commodity price trend was due to. But it appears likely that it contributed to inflationary expectations and hence to a rise in the investment demand for gold. It is worth noting that in September both gold price and the commodity price index fell.

Though interest rates and commodity prices seem to have influenced the recent mini-cycle in gold price, the large amplitude of the cycle is probably explained by the Mexican payments crisis and the subsequent fears of default on debt by other developing countries heavily indebted to international banks. The sharp appreciation in gold price in August (of the order of $100 per ounce) was set in motion by Mexico's troubles with the commercial banks. Though the operation of rescuing Mexico was instantaneously mounted by the Bank of International Settlements, the price of gold continued to rise into the first week of September as the fear spread that other major developing-country borrowers, such
as Brazil, Argentina and Chile were about to default on
their debts.14/

The Mexican crisis came when gold price was moving
up. So it appears that the reaction to the Mexican news
only exaggerated for a while the trend which had already been
set. The sharp fall thereafter represented a correction
adjustment to the exaggerated upward movement.

Conclusions

Our study of the international gold price movements15/
indicates that the real gold price (nominal price deflated
by the price index of manufactured exports) moved in a cycli-
cal fashion during the last decade. The gold price cycles
were, it appears, caused by speculative investment in gold.
The speculative behaviour, in turn, was influenced by the
underlying cycles of economic activity (which were represented
by the index of world trade). Increasing economic activity
generated inflationary expectations and increased the extent
of uncertainty (as reflected in increased exchange rate and
gold price fluctuations). An incentive was therefore, creat-
ed to increase speculative investment in gold, which then
pushed up the gold price. Decreasing economic activity had
the opposite effect.

In general, we found that interest rates did not have
a significant dampening effect on gold price. Rising econo-
mic activity had the effect of 'pulling up' gold price and
interest rates simultaneously. In the face of Inflationary expectations and greater uncertainty, rising interest rates were not able to pull down gold prices. Also, in 1974 - 75, falling activity simultaneously had a depressing effect on gold price and interest rates.

Since mid-1980, however, interest rates have been high (rising sharply over certain periods) even under strong deflationary conditions. Thus gold price has been under the double depressing influence of a deflationary situation and high interest rates.

That speculative investment should have been the dominant influence on gold price reflects, probably, the greater opportunities for financial speculation and reduced expected returns from productive activity in the 1970s and early 1980s. Against the background of the relatively new phenomenon of "stagflation" (long term deceleration in production and rising inflation rates), cyclical movements in economic activity created strong incentives for speculation in gold.\textsuperscript{16/}

The recent buoyancy in gold price, after the sharp fall till June 1982, raises the question whether gold price may now be expected to rise for some time. Our analysis suggests that in the short term gold price is unlikely to rise significantly since world economic activity, according to present projections, is unlikely to rise, and interest rates are not likely to fall much more. In the short run, gold price will rise only if some international crisis develops, but such a rise may only be temporary.
For the long-run, other factors have to be considered. Experts who forecast an upward trend in gold price rely principally on three factors. Firstly they do not foresee any major breakthrough in either annual output or release from the Soviet Block. So now supplies of gold are expected to stabilise at the current level. Secondly, monetary authorities, which at one time played a significant role in the gold market, are not expected to release monetary stocks of gold. Thirdly, investment-cum-speculative demand for gold is expected, with all its ups and downs, to maintain a rising trend.

Even assuming that the raw supplies of gold have no immediate prospect of expanding, the other two assumptions are not quite beyond doubt. The major sword hanging over the gold market is held by the monetary authorities who, as indicated above, control almost half the world stock of gold. The more they hold on to their stock without having much monetary use for it, the greater is the likelihood that one day they may start divesting themselves of this stock. Such a divestment would, of course, depend upon the perception of gold's monetary role and the degree of co-operation amongst monetary authorities in the liquidation of monetary gold, should they decide on that course.

Also, the assumption that speculation will exercise an upward pressure on gold price depends not only on the judgement of investors on the likely long-term strategy of
monetary authorities but also on the long-term trends in economic activity, particularly on the continuance of "stagflation". The path of the international price of gold is not as clearly indicated as in sometimes suggested.
Footnotes

(The authors are grateful to C. Ajayakumar for his statistical assistance)

1/ After 1961, Gold Pool was the institutional mechanism for keeping the nominal price of gold at a constant level. For details, see Einzig, 1972, pp 70 - 73.


3/ The figures are collected by the Bank International Settlements, and represent the external positions of banks in the group of Ten countries, Switzerland, Austria, Denmark, Ireland and some offshore branches of US banks.

4/ The details above are from Govett and Govett, 1982, pp 87-88.

5/ The statistics on gold supply and demand flows used in this section are from Commerce, pp 1116 - 7, which, in turn, has taken the figures from Consolidated Gold Fields Ltd., Annual Report, 1982.

6/ Indian production in the 1970s has been around 3 tons.

7/ The reasons for preferring gold in inflationary and uncertain situations must be sought in traditional and psychological factors.

8/ See Roosa et al, 1982, Tables 1 and 2. The expected rates of return on the dollar changed in mid - 1980 with a large increase in US interest rates, and the share of the dollar in international lending increased thereafter.

9/ The peak attained in January 1980 was partly influenced by the Iran-Iraq conflict. However, even in late 1979, the real price of gold was significantly higher than in December 1974, when the earlier peak was reached. (The role of particular events, such as the Iran-Iraq conflict, is discussed below in section 7.)

10/ The measure captured fluctuations around a trend represented by the average of the monthly growth rates.

11/ The important exceptions are the years 1979 and 1981. These are discussed below.
Once again 1979 and 1981 are exceptions. In 1979, exchange rate fluctuations fell, while gold price fluctuations increased. This suggests that the high inflationary expectations in that year on account of the sharp rise in petroleum price (after four years of stability) resulted in an attempt to move out all currencies into gold. The 1981 experience is discussed below in the main text.

12/ See Marshall, 1923, p 257 and also Robertson, 1959, p 80 - 82.

13/ See the Economist, September 11, 1982, pp 80 - 81.

14/ No corresponding analysis of the Indian gold price movements was attempted. From the Indian point of view, the difference between the international and Indian gold price is of critical importance. This difference principally determines the extent of smuggling of gold and hence the illegal movements in foreign exchange. Thus, even from the Indian viewpoint, an understanding of international gold price movement is extremely important.

15/ This raises some interesting questions on the relationship between speculative investment and its impact on the continuation of stagflation. We cannot go into these large questions here. But one possible line worth pursuing seems to be the question whether the rise in speculative investment (in gold, commodities, currencies, etc.) along with economic cycle uptrend choked off the recovery. That would explain why the recoveries are tending to get shorter.
### Table 1: Growth Trends in the World Economy
(Average annual rate over a few year period)

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**Growth rates of:**
1) World gross domestic product
2) World exports

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1) World gross domest- ic product
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   - 4.9
   - 4.1
   - 3.4
   - 3.9
   - 3.0
   - 2.6

2) World exports
   - 9.5
   - 8.7
   - 6.7
   - 4.3
   - 5.4
   - 3.2
   - 2.3

**Note**: Growth rates for 1981 are preliminary and for 1982 are forecasts.


### Table 2: Uncertainty and Gold Price

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Exchange Rate Fluctuations</th>
<th>Real Gold Price Fluctuations</th>
<th>Real Gold Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>5.36</td>
<td>62.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>4.739</td>
<td>7.95</td>
<td>85.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3.064</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>113.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2.510</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0.977</td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>76.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1.481</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>84.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>2.424</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>96.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1.207</td>
<td>5.81</td>
<td>133.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2.622</td>
<td>13.43</td>
<td>239.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3.664</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>190.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source**: 1) IMF, International Financial Statistics, Various issues
SUPPLY OF GOLD (METRIC TONS)

REAL GOLD PRICE INDEX (1975 = 100)

1971 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81

--- REAL GOLD PRICE INDEX

--- AGGREGATE SUPPLY OF GOLD

--- SUPPLY OF GOLD FOR NON-OFFICIAL USES

CHART 1

SOURCE: 1) COMMERCE, 1982, pp. 116-7
         2) IMF, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, VARIOUS ISSUES.
Chart 2

Source: As in Chart 1
Bullion demand as a percentage of total gold bullion supply.

Chart 3

Source: As in Chart 1
REAL GOLD PRICE INDEX (1975 = 100)
BULLION HOLDINGS + OFFICIAL COINS
TOTAL BULLION SUPPLY $\times 100$

BULLION HOLDINGS + OFFICIAL COINS (METRIC TONS)

--- REAL GOLD PRICE INDEX
--- BULLION HOLDINGS - OFFICIAL COINS
--- BULLION HOLDINGS - OFFICIAL COINS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BULLION SUPPLY

CHART 4
SOURCE: AS IN CHART 1
Chart 5

PRICE INDEX (1975=100)

- - - - NOMINAL PETROLEUM PRICE INDEX
- - - - REAL PETROLEUM PRICE INDEX
- - - - REAL GOLD PRICE

CHART 6
SOURCE: AS IN CHART 5
CHART 7
SOURCE: 1) IMF, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STATISTICS, VARIOUS ISSUES
2) UN, MONTHLY BULLETIN OF STATISTICS, VARIOUS ISSUES
Chart 8
Source: As in Chart 7
CHART 9

SOURCE: AS IN CHART 7
CHART 9

Source: As in Chart 7
Chart 10

Source: As in Chart 7
References:


